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Kant distinguishes the form of experience, which is determined by the subject’s mind, from the matter of experience, which is determined by how the subject is causally affected by objects.  The form of experience is determinable and a priori knowable: I know a priori that objects of outer experience are spatial and obey deterministic causal laws.   The matter of experience, however, is determinate and knowable only a posteriori: I know only through experience that objects have the determinate sizes and shapes they do, and which causal laws they obey.​[1]​  The form of experience is subjective: outer objects are spatiotemporal and obey causal laws because space and time, and the categories are the forms of intuition and understanding, respectively, for human cognitive subjects.  The matter of experience, by contrast, is not wholly determined by my forms of experience: I experience objects as having the determinate spatiotemporal properties and sensible qualities (e.g. colors, tastes, textures) I do partly because of how I am causally affected by them.
This distinction between the form and matter of experience raises an obvious question: which are the objects that causally affect us, giving rise to the matter of experience?​[2]​  The most natural answer is that empirical spatiotemporal objects are the causal source of the matter of experience.  I experience objects as having the determinate spatiotemporal properties I do because those objects causally affect my perceptual system, and there is a law-like connection between the spatiotemporal properties those objects possess, and the way they are represented in the resulting perceptual experience.  This ‘empirical affection’ also explains the non-spatiotemporal component of the matter of experience.  In addition to spatiotemporal properties, my experience represents objects as having various sensible qualities: color, taste, texture, etc.  This ‘sensory matter’ of experience is determined by the way in which empirical objects affect my sense organs.​[3]​
On the other hand, it might be thought that the matter of experience cannot come exclusively from causal affection by empirical objects, because empirical objects are appearances.  Since appearances have their properties in virtue of how they are represented in experience, empirical objects depend partly upon the matter of experience, and thus cannot themselves be the source of that matter.  This line of reasoning suggests that the objects that causally produce the matter of experience by affecting subjects are non-empirical objects, things in themselves.  On this view there is a ‘noumenal affection’ in which things in themselves causally affect subjects.  This noumenal affection produces sensations, which are synthesized by the subject’s mind into experience of empirical objects.  
A third view would be that both kinds of affection are present in Kant’s theory of experience: the subject is affected by empirical objects and by things in themselves.  This view attributes to Kant a doctrine of ‘double affection’ and, as such, it is the conjunction of the ‘empirical affection’ and the ‘noumenal affection’ views.  Given that there are a number of passages that support empirical affection,​[4]​ and almost as many that support noumenal affection,​[5]​ double affection would appear to be the interpretation best supported by Kant’s texts.​[6]​
However, the doctrine of double affection has long stood in ill repute. It has found few defenders among major Kant commentators since Erich Adickes forcefully defended it in the 1920s.​[7]​  The Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism entry on ‘double affection’ nicely summarizes the standard view: 
Double Affection: a theory proposed by the Kant-scholar Erich Adickes to account for the multiple relationships holding between the self as it appears to us and as it is in itself as well as between the appearance of an object and the thing-in-itself . . . The textual evidence for such a reading of Kant is slim, not only in the Critique of Pure Reason, but also in the Opus Postumum, on which Adickes's conjecture is largely based. Not surprisingly, the theory does not enjoy much support among Kant scholars, though it is still occasionally mentioned.​[8]​ 

One reason double affection is unpopular is that one of its conjuncts is noumenal affection, which has been controversial ever since the publication of the first edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft in 1781.​[9]​  It is problematic for Kant to posit a noumenal affection for two related sorts of reasons. First of all, it requires attributing the category ‘cause-effect’ to non-empirical objects, which appears to violate Kant’s restriction of the legitimate use of the categories to objects of possible experience.  Second of all, it appears to conflict with Kant’s doctrine that we are in principle ignorant of things in themselves.​[10]​  Many of Kant’s readers, from 1781 to today, have sought to free him from the perceived albatross of noumenal affection.​[11]​, ​[12]​
	The first alleged problem rests on a mistake. Kant’s ‘restriction’ of the categories to experience means that we cannot know through theoretical means whether things in themselves fall under the categories, but he allows that we can still coherently think of things in themselves as falling under the categories.​[13]​  Kant never denied the coherence of attributing categorical determinations to things in themselves; in fact, his theory of freedom requires attributing causal powers to rational agents considered as things in themselves.​[14]​  The second alleged problem for noumenal affection is not a problem specific to noumenal affection.  Noumenal affection is not the only Kantian doctrine that appears to conflict with the doctrine of noumenal ignorance.  Kant repeatedly claims things in themselves are not spatiotemporal, and that we cannot know anything about them.  Whatever the correct explanation is for why Kant took his doctrine of the ideality of space and time to be compatible with his doctrine of noumenal ignorance, it is likely that this will also be (or be closely connected to) the explanation of why he took the doctrine of noumenal affection to be compatible with the doctrine of noumenal ignorance.  In this respect, the doctrine of noumenal affection is no more or less suspect than the doctrine of the ideality of space and time.​[15]​
	However, this paper will not focus on these problems with the doctrine of double affection, for they are problems that double affection inherits from one of its conjuncts, noumenal affection.  These are problems for double affection, but not the problem of double affection. The main problem with double affection per se is specific to double affection, because it purports to show that noumenal and empirical affection are incompatible. It is a problem of causal exclusion: the causal role of the thing in itself in producing experience appears to exclude any causal role for the empirical object in producing experience.  The reason for this apparent causal exclusion of empirical objects by things in themselves is that empirical objects are appearances of thing in themselves. 
What it means for empirical objects to be appearances of things in themselves is a highly contested question in Kant scholarship, and it is not my intention to address it directly in this paper.  However, I think all partisans to the dispute about Kant’s idealism can agree to the following principle: for any appearance x, if x is F, then x is F in virtue of being experienced to be F, as long as we appropriately constrain what counts as ‘experience’ and as long as we restrict F to ‘empirical’ properties, i.e. properties objects are represented as having in experience.​[16]​   What various interpretations of Kant’s idealism differ on is what makes this claim true.  
This means that Kant is committed to the following two theses:
(Empirical Affection) 	For some appearance x and empirical property F, in standard cases, x’s having F causes S to experience x as F.​[17]​

(Transcendental Idealism)​[18]​	If x is an appearance and F is an empirical property, if x is F then x is F in virtue of S experiencing x as F.

The first principle is just a restatement of empirical affection: the matter of experience is produced by causal affection by the empirical object.  For instance, I experience the bust of Attila on my mantel as having the shape it does because the bust’s having that shape causes me to experience it as having that shape.  The second principle is just the principle I discussed earlier, restricted to empirical properties.  But these two principles are incompatible.  Intuitively, they are incompatible because, if an object has a property in virtue of being experienced as having that property, then the fact that it has that property cannot cause it to be experienced as having that property.  To make this incompatibility more vivid, consider the following, highly plausible claim:
(Exclusion) 	If [p] obtains in virtue of [q], then [p] does not cause [q] to obtain, where ‘[p]’ stands for the fact that p.

This principle – which I will call the ‘Exclusion’ principle – invokes the in-virtue-of relation.  The in-virtue-of relation describes a non-causal order of metaphysical dependence between facts (or propositions, or states-of-affairs, etc.).​[19]​  If [p] obtains in virtue of [q,] then [q] is a metaphysically more basic fact than [p] – [q] can be cited to explain [p], but [p] cannot be cited to explain [q].  If [q] lies at a deeper level than the fact that [p], then [p] cannot cause [q] to obtain. Since [p] obtains in virtue of [q], causing [q] to obtain just is causing [p] to obtain.  Therefore, if [p] were to cause [q], [p] would cause itself to obtain.  Perhaps there are self-causing facts, but facts about the properties of empirical objects are surely are not among them.
If we accept the Exclusion principle, we see that two aspects of Kant’s theory of experience are incompatible with one another: the empirical story, according to which the empirical object causes experience, and the transcendental story, according to which the outer object is merely the appearance of a thing in itself to the subject.  This is the problem I will focus on this paper.	I want to make clear that this problem for double affection is not a problem of causal over-determination.  There is no reason in principle why Kant could not admit that subjects’ perceptual states are causally over-determined, having both a phenomenal cause and a noumenal cause. The Exclusion principle shows that it is not a matter of over-determination but a matter of simple metaphysical impossibility that prevents appearances from being causes of the very perceptual states in virtue of which they have their properties, including their causal properties.  The same reasoning shows that noumenal affection excludes the possibility of empirical affection.
The Exclusion problem has a long history in the reception of Kant’s Critical philosophy. Although he is better known for the remark that “without this assumption [the thing in itself] I could not enter into the system, but with this assumption I could not remain within the system,” F.H. Jacobi also raised the Exclusion problem, and may very well be the first to do so.   In his 1788 work David Hume über den Glauben, oder Realismus und Idealismus: ein Gespräch Jacobi rejects the doctrine of affection, and hence Kant’s definition of sensibility as the capacity to receive representations insofar as we are affected by them, because the affecting objects in question cannot be things in themselves (which are unknowable, and to which the category of cause-effect supposedly does not apply), nor can they be empirical objects because empirical objects are “mere representations” which are “not present outside of us.”​[20]​  Jacobi’s reason for rejecting empirical affection is that he shares the assumption of some of Kant’s early readers that appearances are identical to representations, understood as mental states of subjects; on reading of Kant, appearances cannot affect our mental states because they just are collections of our mental states.  The Exclusion problem shows that a version of Jacobi’s objection remains even if we reject the crude Berkeleyan understanding of Kantian appearances: even if appearances are not just bundles of representations, they have their empirical properties in virtue of the contents of our representations of them, so they cannot be causes of that very content.
A century later Hans Vaihinger took this to show that empirical affection is inconsistent with Kant’s idealism; in this respect, he thought, Kant was inconsistent. In his discussion of the ‘problem of affection’ he points out that if we take the ‘affecting’ objects to be empirical objects in space, then 
appearances are first [erst] posited by us in an original representation; and these appearances that we posit must, of course, first [erst] affect us, before [ehe] we can obtain determinate representations of them; thus they exist before [ehe] they exist.​[21]​ 

I do not think that Vaihinger intends ‘ehe’ and ‘erst’ to refer to relations of temporal priority; his point is that the representations are explanatorily or metaphysically prior to the appearances, but given empirical affection, the appearances are causally prior to the representations.  While Vaihinger does not formulate his point as precisely as I have, I think his objection to empirical affection -- which he admits is a Kantian doctrine -- is the Exclusion problem: empirical objects cannot cause the very representations in virtue of which they have those causal powers (in Vaihinger’s terminology: the very representations by which they are ‘posited’).​[22]​  
More recently, James Van Cleve takes the Exclusion problem to be fatal for the doctrine of double affection.   He takes appearances to be ‘logical constructions’ of perceptual states of subjects,​[23]​ and raises the following problem:
[. . .] constructions can be causes . . . but how can they be causes of the very items out of which they are constructed? If As [appearances] are constructions out of Bs [perceptual states] (or reducible to Bs or logically supervenient on Bs— the differences among these do not at present matter), how can they be causes of Bs [perceptual states] ? It is a compelling thought that the cause of an item must have some being and constitution over and above that which it causes.​[24]​

The final sentence is a clear invocation of the Exclusion principle; the problem Van Cleve raises here is the Exclusion problem.  He takes this problem to be insuperable, and concludes: “I find the theory of double affection intriguing but in the end untenable.”​[25]​
	What Jacobi, Vaihinger and Van Cleve’s discussions bring out is that the Exclusion problem is faced by any interpretation of Kant that attributes to him both Empirical Affection and Transcendental Idealism (as understood above).  However, it is especially acute for the doctrine of double affection, for it purports to show that noumenal and empirical affection are incompatible.   According to the noumenal affection conjunct of double affection, things in themselves causally affect human cognitive subjects, producing sensations which are then processed and synthesized by the subject’s mind into experiences of empirical objects.  What the Exclusion argument brings out is that this leaves no room for empirical affection: noumenal affection, plus synthesis by the subject’s mind, determines the content of experience, both material and formal.  Since the content of this experience determines the properties of empirical objects, those empirical objects cannot be among the causes of the content of that experience.  Empirical objects cannot reach back to causally affect the very experiences in virtue of which they have their empirical properties.  It would appear that noumenal affection excludes any empirical affection.  Furthermore, although the Exclusion problem arises for any view that attributes both Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Affection to Kant -- and is thus in the first place a problem for Empirical Affection -- my solution to the problem will show how to accommodate both empirical and noumenal affection.  It thus constitutes a defense of the doctrine of double affection.
My solution to the Exclusion problem consists in pointing out that the sense of ‘experience’ involved in the Empirical Affection premise is not the sense of ‘experience’ involved in the Transcendental Idealism premise.  In the next section, I argue that they are distinct and explain the latter sense of ‘experience,’ which I will call ‘Strong Experience.’  In section three I use this conception of ‘Strong Experience’ to develop a version of the doctrine of double affection that solves the Exclusion problem.  In section four I reply to various objections.




‘Experience’ in the Empirical Affection premise refers to the particular perceptual experiences of individual subjects.  To return to the example from the introduction, my present perceptual experience of the bust of Attila the Hun on my mantle is caused by the bust of Attila, an appearance.  However, the bust of Attila does not have its shape in virtue of that present perceptual episode, because my present perceptual episode could misrepresent its shape.  Nor does the bust of Attila have its determinate shape in virtue of any of my, or anyone else’s, particular perceptual experiences.  In this section I will clarify the notion of ‘experience’ in the Transcendental Idealism premise and – which I call ‘Strong Experience’ -- how it determines the empirical properties of empirical objects.
	Kant thinks that empirical objects are appearances of things in themselves to subjects.  A great deal has been written concerning whether this means that the appearance and the thing in itself are one object considered in two different ways – and, if so, in which ways – or whether they are two objects.  However, the question about the ontology of appearances that I want to focus on is independent of that debate.   I want to know what it is in virtue of which an appearance has the properties it does.  
We started with the idea that appearances have the properties they do in virtue of being experienced as having those properties.  There are at least two ways in which this claim needs to be qualified.  First, it cannot possibly apply to all properties of appearances, for appearances are appearances of non-spatiotemporal things in themselves but they are not (presumably) experienced as being such.​[26]​ Let us say that an appearance derives its ‘empirical properties’ from how it is represented: shape, size, mass, causal powers, duration, etc.  I do not know how to precisely delimit the range of the empirical properties of appearances, but that is not the focus of this paper.​[27]​  The second problem is that appearances do not have their empirical properties in virtue of how they are represented by individual subjects. This shows that the experiences whose contents determine which properties appearances have are not the particular experiences of individual subjects.  
	Kant is not particularly forthcoming about how experience determines the empirical properties of empirical objects, but he does suggest an answer in this passage from the Antinomies:
In space and time, however, the empirical truth of appearances is satisfactorily secured, and sufficiently distinguished from its kinship with dreams, if both are correctly and thoroughly connected up according to empirical laws in one [einer] experience.  Accordingly, the objects of experience are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and they do not exist at all outside it [existieren außer derselben gar nicht]. (A493/B521)​[28]​

Kant here claims that the “empirical truth of appearances” – which I take to mean the empirical truth about appearances, or the truth about what empirical properties appearances have -- depends upon how they are represented in ‘one experience’ which is unified by empirical law.  This passage only makes sense if ‘experience’ here means something stronger than just any perceptual episode with objective purport.  In this ordinary sense, even a dream is an experience.  But in this context, experience means veridical experience.  That is why Kant here speaks of ‘one experience,’ and contrasts experience with dreams.  I take Kant’s point here to be that a particular experience is part of the ‘one’ experience and therefore is veridical – i.e. is distinguished from a dream, hallucination, or other non-veridical perceptual episode -- if and only if it coheres with this ‘one’ experience as a whole.  The ‘one’ experience is grounded in experiences that cohere with one another.  In what follows, I will refer to this ‘one’ experience as ‘Strong Experience.’
Before saying more about what Strong Experience is, I want to distinguish several different senses in which Kant uses the term ‘experience’ [Erfahrung].   Consider Kant’s claim in the A Deduction that “there is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or non-being take place.  If one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience” (A110; Kant’s emphasis).  Kant here distinguishes between the ‘one’ experience -- which I take to be the ‘one experience’ of A493/B521 -- and experiences, individual perceptual episodes.  But not every perceptual episode is an experience in the second sense: perceptions are experiences only insofar as they “belong to one and the same universal experience.”  I take this to mean that a perception is an experience only insofar as its content is retained in the content of the ‘one’ universal experience.  For instance, my perceptual hallucination of a pink elephant is not an experience, because its representational content is not retained in the representational content of the ‘one’ experience; because my perceptual hallucination has no inter-subjective validity, the ‘one universal’ experience does not represent a pink elephant in front of me.  To avoid confusion, I will henceforth reserve the term ‘experience’ exclusively for Strong Experience; I will refer to the individual perceptual episodes whose experiences can, to varying degrees, be incorporated into Strong Experience as ‘perceptions.’  Below I will spell out more precisely what it is, on my interpretation, for a perception to be ‘an experience,’ that is,  “to belong to one and the same universal experience.”​[29]​
The relation of coherence that defines the ‘one’ experience is coherence according to empirical causal laws: a given perception episode is a veridical experience if and only if it coheres with Strong Experience according to the empirical laws that hold in Strong Experience.   As Kant remarks in the Refutation of Idealism, “whether this or that putative experience is not mere imagination must be ascertained according to its particular determinations and through its coherence with the criteria of all actual experience” (B279).  This passage by itself does not tell us how Strong Experience is grounded in individual perceptions.  It only gives a criterion of whether a given perception, a putative experience, belongs to it, presupposing we already have a grasp on what the ‘one experience,’ Strong Experience, is.​[30]​ 
To return to the passage from the Antinomies, Kant continues:
That there could be inhabitants of the moon [daß es Einwohner im Monde geben könne], even though no human being has perceived them, must of course be admitted; but this means only that in the possible progress of experience we could encounter them [auf sie treffen könnten]; for everything is actual that stands in one context with a perception in accordance with the laws of the empirical progression.  Thus they are real when they stand in empirical connection with my real consciousness, although they are not therefore real in themselves, i.e. outside this progress of experience. (A493/B521)

We can now understand what Kant means in this passage.  Whether the moon is inhabited depends upon whether Strong Experience represents it as inhabited.  There might be perception that represent the moon as inhabited (e.g. dreams or hallucinations) even though it is not; a perception of the moon as inhabited only entails that it is inhabited if that experience is incorporated into Strong Experience.   This passage also sheds light on how Strong Experience is grounded in individual perceptions.  When Kant writes that “everything is actual that stands in one context with a perception in accordance with the laws of the empirical progression” I take him to mean that Strong Experience does not only include objects that are directly perceived; Strong Experiences also includes unperceived objects posited in accordance with empirical laws in order to explain perceptions had by subjects.  Strong Experience includes objects that are unobserved and even objects that are not (directly) observable.
This is confirmed by Kant’s discussion of magnetic matter in the “Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General”:
The postulate for cognizing the actuality of things requires perception, thus sensation of which one is conscious – not immediate perception of the object itself the existence of which is to be cognized, but still its connection with some actual perception in accordance with the analogies of experience, which exhibit all real connection in an experience in general. [. . .] However, one can also cognize the existence of the thing prior to the perception of it, and therefore cognize it comparatively a priori, if only it is concerned with some perceptions in accordance with the principles of their empirical connection (the analogies).  For in that case the existence of the thing is still connected with our perceptions in a possible experience, and with the guidance of the analogies we can get from our actual perceptions to the thing in the series of possible perceptions.  Thus we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of attracted iron filings, although an immediate perception of this matter is impossible for us, given the constitution of our organs.  For in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions we could also happen upon the immediate empirical intuition of it in an experience if our senses, the crudeness of which does not affect the form of possible experience in general, were finer.  Thus wherever perception and whatever is appended to it in accordance with empirical law reaches, there too reaches our cognition of the existence of things.  If we do not begin with experience, or proceed in accordance with laws of the empirical connection of appearances, then we are only making a vain display of wanting to discover or research the existence of any thing. (A225-6/B273-4)​[31]​

Kant is doing a lot in this passage, but I want to focus on a few of the most important claims.  He claims that the limits of experience are not set by the contingent limitations of our sense organs.  Just because I cannot physically perceive an object, either because it is too small, or too large, or does not belong to the visible light portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, does not mean it is not an object of experience, or that it is not an empirical object.  Strong Experience includes all of the objects we directly perceive, as well as objects that are posited by our best justified scientific theories to causally explain perceived phenomena.​[32]​
This shows that Strong Experience is not merely the collection of all perceptions of subjects, or even the most coherent subset of that collection.   As Kant reminds us in the Prolegomena, “heed well this distinction of experience from a mere aggregate of perceptions” (Ak. 4:310). Strong Experience is a representation with a content; this means merely that it represents objects as being a certain way. In what follows, I will sometimes refer to it as a ‘theory.’ I do not mean this term to bring with it any anachronistic connotations; I mean merely that it will be representation with a content more complex than any individual perception or judgment. We need to determine the content of Strong Experience, and how that content is related to the content of subjects’ perceptions.  I think the relation between ‘perception’ and ‘experience’ is closely related to the distinction between ‘judgments of perception’ [Wahrnehmungsurtheile] and ‘judgments of experience’ [Erfahrungsurtheile] in the Prolegomena (Ak. 4:298-301​[33]​), and what I take to be the corresponding distinction between ‘appearance’ (of relative motion) and ‘experience’ (of motion determined relative to an inertial reference frame) in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe.​[34]​  My interpretive hypothesis will be: a judgment of perception is a judgment that reports the content of a perception, while a judgment of experience is a judgment whose content is experienced in the ‘Strong’ sense; if I make a judgment of experience that p then Strong Experience represents that p.​[35]​  Likewise, if I experience the true motions of bodies by determining them according relative to a reference frame using the principles of motion given in Metaphysishce Anfangsgründe (e.g. the principle of inertia) Strong Experience represents those bodies as having those motions.​[36]​  
First of all, this shows that the relation between perception and experience is a justificatory one. In the Prolegomena the perception that the sun’s shining on the stone is followed by the sun becoming warm partly justifies the judgment of experience that the former event causes the latter (though it is not the whole justification)​[37]​.  In the Kritik, our perception movement of the iron fillings partly justifies us in inferring the existence of the magnetic field (though it is not the whole justification). In the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe the perception of apparent motion partially justifies the experience of the true motions determined relative to an inertial reference frame (though it is not the whole justification).  In each case, we could not (Strong) experience the object without the partial justification provided by the mere perception.  In each case, the justificatory role of the perception is supplemented by a priori materials: in the first two cases, by the principle of causation, and in the third case, by (among other things) the principle that true motions are determined according to reference frames in which Newton’s laws of motion hold.  In some cases, the judgment of experience is justified by, in addition to perceptions and a priori principles and intuitions, empirical laws.​[38]​ But ultimately that empirical law was experienced (cognized through experience) by the application of a priori principles and intuitions to a perception.  So the ultimate a posteriori source of justification for Strong Experience is perceptions.
At this point I could offer my own interpretation of what exactly Strong Experience is, and how its content is determined, and justified, by a posteriori perceptions and a priori contents (the a piori forms of space and time, the categories, etc.).  However, fully articulating and defending such an interpretation would require at least a paper of its own.  My solution to the Exclusion problem, however, will not depend upon the details of my own view about what Strong Experience is.  It will depend only upon two features of Kant’s view of experience:
(1)	Perceptions partially justify experience; the other source of justification is the content of various a priori representatins (space, time, categories, principles of experience, possibly regulative principles).

(2)	Experience is a richer more complex representation than any perception, or the complete set of perceptions of subjects.

I take it that (2) is relatively uncontroversial, and I have given some reasons in favor of (1).   However, some readers are likely to object against (1) that it is incoherent to describe perceptions as justifying experience because only judgments or propositions can be justified, and experience is not a judgment or a proposition.  I think this objection is exactly right, but (1) can be reformulated to avoid it:
(1)	Facts about the content of experience are grounded in justificatory relationships between that content, a priori contents and the contents of perceptions; consequently, experience has the content it does partly in virtue of the justificatory relationship between that content and the content of perceptions.

This avoids the objection, and, I take it, is relatively uncontroversial.  Since I am primarily concerned in this paper with the role of affection (empirical and noumenal) in Kant’s theory, I will be focusing almost exclusively on the role that the contents of perceptions play in grounding the content of Strong Experience.  The role of a priori contents -- including, space, time, the categories, the principles of experience, possibly even regulative principles of pure reason -- in that grounding lies largely outside the scope of this paper.
	In the first passage from the Antinomies, Kant claims that appearances exist in virtue of how they are experienced.  If I am correct about my identification of Strong Experience as the representation whose content determines the empirical properties of appearances, this means that the second premise of the Exclusion argument should read:
(Transcendental Idealism)	For any appearance x and empirical property F, if x is F, x is F in virtue of the fact that Strong Experience represents x as F.​[39]​

Another way of putting this would be to say that appearances are the intentional objects of Strong Experience, with the proviso that this only applies to their empirical properties, not to whether they exist.​[40]​, ​[41]​  In this paper I want to remain neutral on whether appearances exist in virtue of being represented by experience, because some ‘one object’ readers of Kant’s transcendental idealism would reject that claim and in this paper I want to remain neutral on the ‘one object/two object’ debate;  however, see A375n and A493/B521 for some evidence that Kant did hold that empirical objects would not exist without being experienced.​[42]​  
	Now that we have distinguished Strong Experience from the particular experiences (perceptions) of subjects at particular times, and identified appearances as the intentional objects of Strong Experience, we are in a position to solve the exclusion problem.  But before I do this, I want to counter several potential objections.	
	I have argued that empirical objects have their empirical properties in virtue of how they are actually represented by Strong Experience. I anticipate that some readers will be tempted by an alternate, counterfactual understanding of how empirical objects depend upon experience.  The idea behind this view is that it is not necessary that we actually experience an empirical object (or have sensory states that justify a Strong Experience that posits the existence of that object); it is sufficient that, if we were in the right conditions, we would experience this object.  There are many ways of working out the counterfactual view in detail, but I think we can reject it without going into its details.  At first glance, the counterfactual view is suggested by Kant’s claim, quoted earlier, that “that there could be inhabitants of the moon [daß es Einwohner im Monde geben könne], even though no human being has perceived them, must of course be admitted; but this means only that in the possible progress of experience we could encounter them [auf sie treffen könnten]” (A493/B521).  Kant here claims that the fact (if it is a fact) that there could be inhabitants of the moon is the fact that inhabitants of the moon could be experienced.  This is compatible with two ways of understanding the fact (if it is a fact) that there are inhabitants of the moon.  Compatible with what Kant here says, this fact can be identified either as the fact that inhabitants of the moon are experienced, or with the fact that we would experience them if we were, for instance, to go to the moon. But the latter, counterfactual interpretation is not born out by the rest of the passage; Kant writes in the next paragraph: “To call an appearance a real thing prior to perception means either that in the continuation of experience we must [müssen] encounter such a perception, or it has no meaning at all” (A493/B521).   Kant is saying that, prior to sensory data that would justify positing the existence of inhabitants of the moon, to say that there are inhabitants of the moon is to say that we will eventually have such data.   This is flatly incompatible with the counterfactual reading; if Kant held the counterfactual view, he would have written “to call an appearance a real thing prior to perception means either we would encounter [treffen würden] such a perception if we were appropriately situated or it has no meaning at all.” 	
	Similar to the counterfactual view, some readers will propose what I will call a ‘modal’ account of how empirical objects depend upon experience: empirical objects have their empirical properties, not in virtue of how we do experience (my view) them or how we would experience them (the counterfactual view), but in virtue of how we could experience them.  To paraphrase Kant, to call an appearance a real thing prior to perception means either that in the continuation of experience we could encounter such a perception, or it means nothing at all.  This interpretation receives some encouragement from Kant’s claim in the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General (quoted earlier) that “in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions we could also happen upon the immediate empirical intuition of [magnetic matter] in an experience if our senses, the crudeness of which does not affect the form of possible experience in general, were finer” (A226/B274).  But Kant is not here identifying the fact that there is magnetic matter with the fact that we could perceive it, if our senses were finer (or just different, i.e. if we could see electromagnetic fields).   In the context of the larger passage, he is identifying the fact that there is magnetic matter with the fact that we do have perceptions that justify the positing of the existence of magnetic matter.  In the sentence quoted he is merely pointing out one consequence of this: if our sense organs were finer, we could directly perceive the magnetic matter.  The point of this sentence is that which empirical objects exist does not depend upon contingent facts about the grain of our sense organs.  Furthermore, the ‘modal’ interpretation is incompatible with the very same textual evidence that defeats the counterfactual interpretation; in all of those passages, Kant describes empirical objects as dependent upon how we actually experience them, not on how we could experience them.  I have argued that the relevant notion of experience is Strong Experience.




The solution to the exclusion problem consists in carefully specifying the various relationships of dependence within Kant’s transcendental theory of experience.  
1.	Things in themselves causally affect subjects, producing sensations with certain contents.  This first relationship of dependence is a causal one: it holds between (facts about) the constitution and nature of things in themselves (unknowable by us), and (facts about) the contents of sensations in subjects. ​[43]​ 
2.	The totality of these sensory contents together with a priori contents (space, time, categories, principles of experience) justify the content of Strong Experience.  Consequently, the sensory contents partly justify the content of Strong Experience (they are part of its total justification).  Specifically, they justify the matter of Strong Experience, the features of the content of Strong Experience left undetermined by the a priori forms of experience.  I am interested specifically in the relation of partial justification between the sensory contents and the content of Strong Experience. I cannot say much more about this justificatory relation without giving a whole interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience, and that lies outside the scope of this essay.​[44]​
3.	Various empirical objects have their empirical properties in virtue of being represented as existing and having those properties by Strong Experience.  The third relationship of dependence is a metaphysical one, an instance of the ‘in virtue of’ relation: it holds between facts about the content of Strong Experience and facts about the empirical properties of appearances.  
4.	The appearances whose empirical properties are determined by being represented in Strong Experience include both inner perceptual states of subjects, and outer empirical objects.  In some cases, these perceptual states represent their objects as having a certain property and are caused to have that content by their object having that property.  This dependence relationship is a causal one: it holds between (facts about) some  perceptual states of subjects and (facts about) empirical objects.
5.	Finally, this causal relation itself obtains in virtue of the fact that it is represented to obtain by Strong Experience.   Strong Experience represents both the empirical objects and the subject’s psychological states, and their respective empirical properties (from (4) above), but, in standard cases, also represents the empirical object as causing the psychological state.   This causal relation obtains in virtue of being represented to obtain by Strong Experience.  This is a relationship of metaphysical dependence between (facts about) the content of Strong Experience, on the one hand, and (facts about) the relationship of causal dependence between the perceptual states of human subjects and the properties of the outer appearances that cause those perceptual states, on the other.
This complicated network of relations of dependence is presented in Figure One:


At no point in this network of dependence relations do we have one set of facts obtaining in virtue of the very set of facts they cause to obtain.  In other words, we have no violations of the Exclusion principle:
(Exclusion) 	If [p] obtains in virtue of [q], then [p] does not cause [q] to obtain, where ‘[p]’ stands for the fact that p.

We also retain the truth of both Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Affection:
(Transcendental Idealism)	For any appearance x and empirical property F, if x is F, x is F in virtue of the fact that Strong Experience represents x as F.

(Empirical Affection) 	For some appearance x and empirical property F, in standard cases, x’s having F causes S to experience x as F.

Transcendental Idealism is made true by (3) and empirical affection is made true by (4); (5) shows that the causal relationship in (4) obtains in virtue of (3).  Straightening out this complicated network of relationships of dependence shows that whatever other problems Kant’s theory of experience faces, it does not face the problem we originally started with.   There may be problems with double affection, but ‘the problem of double affection’ as conceived by James Van Cleve and others, is not, in fact, a problem.
	Furthermore, it solves a closely related problem raised by Van Cleve.  As we saw in the Introduction, Van Cleve argues that Transcendental Idealism excludes Empirical Affection.  His reason is that he takes appearances to be logical constructions of perceptual states, and he quite correctly draws the conclusion that an object cannot cause the very items of which it is a logical construction (an instance of the Exclusion principle, from above​[45]​).  Our discussion so far has shown where Van Cleve went wrong: although appearances depend upon experience, namely Strong Experience, they do not depend upon the particular perceptual states of individual subjects.  Van Cleve failed to distinguish the sense of ‘experience’ involved in Strong Experience from the sense of ‘experience’ involved in Empirical Affection.
	However, Van Cleve raises another problem.  In his discussion of Kant’s theory of primary and secondary qualities, he correctly observes that Kant holds the familiar Lockean view that empirical objects possess primary qualities (e.g. extension, shape, size, etc.) but lack secondary qualities (color, taste, smell, etc.).​[46]​  Empirical objects, in virtue of their primary qualities, cause us to experience them as possessing various secondary qualities.​[47]​  But Van Cleve thinks that Kant’s ‘Lockean’ empirical psychology is incompatible with this transcendental idealism, for the former requires that “a phenomenal cause (a body in space, existing only as the intentional object of a conscious state) would have a noumenal effect (one of those very states, which presumably must belong to a noumenal self).”​[48]​  My version of double affection shows why Van Cleve’s argument is mistaken; there is no need to posit ‘downward’ causation from phenomena to noumena, which would indeed be deeply problematic.  A phenomenal object, for instance, a body in space with a given surface reflectance profile (to invoke some vision science unknown to Kant), causes a perceptual experience of red in me, but this perceptual experience is not a ‘noumenal’ state.  It is an inner appearance and as such is determined by Strong Experience just as much as the body in space is.  In general, the inner appearances determined by Strong Experience will include perceptual experiences of colors, tastes, smells, etc.  The outer appearances will include spatial objects with various micro-structural surface properties.  Strong Experience will represent those outer objects as causing those inner appearances in virtue of their micro-structural surface properties (e.g. causing visual experiences of color in virtue of their surface reflectance profiles).  No downward causation from phenomena to noumena is needed.​[49]​
	Although I have presented this version of the doctrine of double affection in a ‘two object’ fashion, it is fully compatible with a ‘one object’ reading.  While my ‘two object’ view has treated the appearance and the thing in itself as numerically distinct objects playing distinct causal roles, a ‘one object’ reading would distinguish the causal roles played by two different kinds of properties possessed by one and the same object: properties the object has in itself (call them the N properties), on the one hand, and properties the object appears to have, on the other (call them E properties).  On the ‘one object’ version of double affection, objects causally affect subjects in virtue of their N properties.  This affection produces sensations in the subject.  These sensations justify Strong Experience, which represents the subject and the object as having certain E properties.  The E properties Strong Experience represents the subject as having include properties of enjoying various perceptual experiences.  Call these the S properties. The E properties Strong Experience represents the object as having include various spatiotemporal and causal properties. Call these the O properties.  Furthermore, Strong Experience represents the object, in virtue of its O properties, as causally affecting the subject and producing the S properties.  Now we identify the thing in itself with the object qua possessor of N properties, and we identify the outer appearance as the object qua possessor of E properties (specifically, O properties).  It follows that the thing in itself (the object qua possessor of N properties) causally affects the subject, and so does the appearance (the object qua possessor of E properties).  In standard cases, the subject has the perceptual experiences it does (S properties) because of this causal affection by the appearance (the object qua possessor of E properties).  Double affection does not require a ‘two object’ reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism.​[50]​




It may seem to some readers that, in the course of defending the doctrine of double affection, I have committed myself to interpretive claims that are at least as bad, if not worse.  In this section, I reply to what I take to be the most pressing objections.
	One aspect of my interpretation that will give pause to some readers is the claim that the inner representational states of individual subjects have their empirical properties (e.g. temporal duration, representational content, etc.), in virtue of being represented by Strong Experience.  Although this is a counter-intuitive claim, it should not be controversial that it represents Kant’s position, since it is a fairly direct consequence of the ideality of time, and the doctrine that I know myself only as I appear to myself, not as I am.   This means that the inner states I am aware of in inner sense are appearances, and, as Kant repeatedly reminds us, appearances “are never given in themselves, but only in experience” (A492/B591).  I take this to mean that temporal entities, inner states as well as outer objects, have their empirical properties in virtue of how they are represented in experience.  The question is, what is the relevant notion of ‘experience’ that determines the properties of inner states?   The natural answer is ‘inner sense’ or what Kant sometimes calls ‘empirical apperception’ but this suggestion faces insuperable problems.  If my inner states have their empirical properties in virtue of how I am aware of them in inner sense, it follows that I have indubitable knowledge of my inner states.  It is indubitable because the properties of those states are determined by the content of my very awareness of them.  Furthermore, this view entails that my knowledge of my inner states does not depend upon my knowledge of outer objects; since the empirical properties of my inner states are determined by the contents of my acts of introspection, my acts of introspections provide knowledge of those empirical states that does not depend upon my knowledge of outer objects.  First of all, it is simply highly implausible that my knowledge of my inner states is indubitable.  Nothing is more commonplace than some inner state seeming to last longer than it in fact did (e.g. a philosophy talk).  
	Secondly, on Kant’s view, my knowledge of my inner states does depend on my knowledge of outer objects.  Although the correct interpretation of the argument in the Refutation of Idealism is a matter of some controversy,​[51]​ it is clear that he there claims that our knowledge of the temporal determinations (order, duration, etc.) of our inner states depends upon our knowledge of outer objects.  The argument is directed against the ‘problematic idealist,’ who takes our epistemic access to our own inner states to be immediate and non-inferential, but holds that our knowledge of the external world is based on an inference to the cause of our inner states.  Since different causes can produce the same effect, this gives rise to the ‘problem’ of idealism: how do we know that our experiences correspond to objects outside us?  Kant claims to have reversed the order of epistemic dependence claimed by the problematic idealist: my knowledge (cognition) of the temporal determinations (order, duration, etc.) of my inner states depends upon my knowledge of external objects.  For instance, I know that the philosophy talk that seemed to last for hours in fact lasted only forty-five minutes, because I know that my iPad keeps reliable time.  Kant contrasts the “I think,” the bare awareness of myself as a thinking subject, with “inner experience,” determinate awareness of the temporal properties of my inner states based partly on inner sense, and partly on my experience of outer objects and how they causally influence those inner states.  My knowledge of my inner states depends upon my knowledge of the outer world.
	By itself, this does not yet vindicate my claim that inner states possess their empirical properties in virtue of how they are represented in Strong Experience.  However, it does show that the experience in virtue of which my inner states have the empirical properties they do cannot be mere empirical apperception.  Furthermore, it shows that it cannot be mere ‘inner experience.’  My ‘inner experience’ is mediated by my experience of outer objects, and, as we have already seen, that outer experience can be mistaken.  For instance, I might experience the talk as beginning at 3:30 and experience it as ending at 4:30 and thus experience my inner state of hearing the talk as lasting for an hour – and this would be a paradigm instance of inner experience – but, if the clock on my iPad were 15 minutes fast, then my inner experience of the temporal duration of my inner state would be incorrect.​[52]​  The more general lesson here is that inner states are appearances, appearances have their empirical properties in virtue of the content of some set of representations, and the only set of representations whose content is guaranteed to be veridical is what I have called ‘Strong Experience.’  If inner states are the intentional objects​[53]​ of some set of representations, it must be Strong Experience.
	On my view, empirical objects affect the representational states of subjects in virtue of being represented by Strong Experience as affecting them.  Some readers will object that this gives empirical affection short shrift.  A causal relation, they might claim, that obtains in virtue of being represented to obtain is not a real relation of causal efficacy.  For Kant to vindicate empirical affection, he must show that empirical affection is grounded in real forces in the outer empirical object.  However, I do not think that a causal relation’s obtaining in virtue of being represented to obtain is incompatible with its being grounded in real forces.  If Strong Experience represents outer objects as having forces, and standing in causal relationships grounded in these forces, then they do.   There is no sense to the further question Yes, but do they really have forces?  Because they are intentional objects,​[54]​ that is all there is to their having forces.  Kant suggests at several points that the forces possessed by empirical objects are manifestations or appearances of forces in things in themselves.​[55]​  This might help relieve the worry that, on my account, empirical objects do not really have forces, but are merely represented as having them: they have forces because they are represented as having forces, and because they are appearances of things in themselves whose forces appear as the very forces they are represented as having.
	This relates to another qualification I want to make regarding my formulation of the Transcendental Idealism premise in the original argument.  I formulated that premise so that it gives the conditions under which an appearance has a given empirical property; it does not give the conditions under which a given object is an appearance, or the conditions under which a given appearance exists.​[56]​  This is because I do not want to claim that all there is to being an appearance is being the intentional object of Strong Experience. If this were the case, things in themselves would be the external causes of empirical objects, but Kant claims something stronger: empirical objects are appearances of things in themselves.  While it is not clear what more he intends by claiming that things in themselves appear as spatiotemporal empirical objects, there are at least two things he might have in mind.   For one thing, he might mean that the forces possessed by empirical objects are appearances of forces in things in themselves.  However, it is not clear what more there is for forces in things in themselves to ‘appear’ as phenomenal forces than for those forces in things in themselves to cause sensations that justify a Strong Experience which represents empirical objects as having those phenomenal forces.  Another thing he might mean is that that there is a structural isomorphism between empirical objects and things and themselves.  Again, it is unclear whether a mere isomorphism of structure between phenomena and things in themselves is sufficient to justify the claim that phenomena are appearances of things in themselves, rather than the weaker claim that things in themselves cause sensations that justify Strong Experience whose content is structurally isomorphic to those things in themselves.  Regardless of these difficulties with Kant’s view, doing full justice to it would involve the requirement that the objects Strong Experience represents as existing are appearances only if things in themselves and their forces ‘appear’ or ‘manifest’ in those objects.  I have raised two related problems with how we should understand the notion of ‘appearance’ here, but resolving those problems – and vindicating Kant’s claim that empirical objects are appearances of things in themselves – lies outside the scope of this paper.  The Appendix contains extended discussion of a final objection.

	Substantial textual evidence supports attributing to Kant both conjuncts of double affection: empirical affection, and noumenal affection.  However, the doctrine of double affection faces several significant problems.  Some of these problems, it shares with other doctrines that Kant uncontroversially held.  For instance, it is unclear how the doctrine of double affection is compatible with Kant’s doctrine that we are in principle ignorant of things in themselves.  This is a problem it shares with various other Kantian claims about things in themselves, especially the doctrine that they are nonspatial and nontemporal.  Furthermore, the doctrine of double affection inherits many of these problems from its more controversial conjunct, noumenal affection. The Exclusion problem, however, is unique to double affection; it is the most significant problem faced by double affection per se.  I have argued that the solution to this problem consists in distinguishing the sense of experience in which the empirical properties of empirical objects depend upon experience – which I call ‘Strong Experience’ – and the sense of experience in which empirical objects cause the matter of experience.

Appendix: Exclusion Strikes Back?

In this section I want to address a particularly difficult objection to my interpretation.  In my original account of Strong Experience, and throughout the paper, I have used ‘sensations’ and ‘perceptions,’ interchangeably, as the empirical justifiers of Strong Experience.  However, as readers of Kant know, ‘sensation’ and ‘perception’ do not in general mean the same thing in his system. According to Kant’s primary usage, sensations are not intentional states, whereas perceptions (empirical intuitions) are; sensations, unlike perceptions, do not have ‘relation to an object.’​[57]​  I have used these terms interchangeably because I want to remain uncommitted, until now, about which class of representations is the empirical justifier for Strong Experience.  Problems arise for either candidate.  I first discuss sensations, and then I discuss perceptions.
If sensations lack intentional content (i.e. relation to an object) how can they justify Strong Experience?  One response would be to bite the bullet and admit that sensations justify Strong Experience without themselves being intentional states.   Strong Experience is a representation of inner and outer objects.  Such a representation can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the actual pattern of sensory states had by subjects; if it represents subjects as having sensory states wildly different than the states they actually have it is disconfirmed.   If we assume that a theory or highly complex representation like Strong Experience can be justified by some pattern or distribution among objects in virtue of being confirmed by them, then the pattern of sensory states we actually have can be the empirical justifiers of Strong Experience.  So far, there is no problem of how Strong Experience can be justified by sensory states. Analogously, the motions of particles in a cloud chamber are not themselves intentional states, nor do they have any intentional content, but they can provide the empirical justification for a theory of particle physics.
The worry that sensations themselves cannot justify Strong Experience is sometimes motivated by the Sellarsian principle that only propositional structured items (beliefs, sentences, thoughts, etc.) can stand in rational relations like justification. The idea that a mere sensory state can justify a theory is alleged to be an instance of the ‘Myth of the Given’ according to which brute sensory data justify our beliefs.   Going back to the analogy of the motions of particles in a cloud chamber, the analogous objection would be that the theory cannot be justified by the motions themselves, but must be justified by observation-sentences about the motions or something similar (e.g. beliefs). But even if we accept the Sellarsian principle that only propositionally structured entities can stand in rational relations like justification we have such  propositionally structured entities: facts about our sensations.  On this view, the relata of the justification relation are, on the one hand, facts of the form [subject S has sensory state P in context C] (where ‘[p]’ stands for the fact that p), and Strong Experience on the other. On such a view, the empirical justifiers of Strong Experience are facts, rather than sensory states themselves.  A committed Sellarsian would no doubt raise objections at this point – for instance, whether Strong Experience can be justified by facts rather than by beliefs or judgments --  but determining any further whether Kant is guilty of falling into the Myth of the Given, and whether this is in fact a bad thing, lies outside the scope of this paper. 
Regardless of whether this satisfies Sellarsian scruples, some readers will wonder how Kantian this solution is.  I share this concern.  I don’t think that Kant would describe sensations (or facts about them) as justifying Strong Experience. The more Kantian alternative would be to take perceptions, empirical intuitions, to justify Strong Experience (as I did in section two).  For instance, in Kant’s reconstruction of Newtonian physics within the Critical philosophy in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Newton’s laws are a priori principles by which we transform perceptions of motion (apparent motion, motion relative to our reference frame) into experience of motion (the true motions of bodies, motion relative to a family of inertial reference frames).  On Michael Friedman’s widely influential reading of the ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Phenomenology’ section, Kant is reconstructing Newton’s derivation of the inverse square-law and the true motions of the planets around the sun in the General Scholium to Prinicipa mathematica.  On this reading, the a posteriori evidential input is the observed motions of the planets relative to the earth.  In my terminology, perceptions of apparent motion are the a posteriori evidential input that allows us to derive the Strong Experience of the true motions.​[58]​ Nonetheless, if there prove to be insuperable problems with perceptions as the justifiers of Strong Experience, I still have sensations as a fallback position; I agree there is something unsatisfying with sensations justifying Strong Experience, but nothing so problematic that I would reject the doctrine of double affection rather than endorse it.
Earlier I simply accepted the objection’s presupposition that sensations, for Kant, are not intentional states.  There are texts in which Kant says that sensations are states of subjects that do not ‘relate’ or ‘refer’ to objects, which I take to mean that sensations have no intentionality.​[59]​  However, other texts show that Kant has a more nuanced conception of sensation. ​[60]​   Some sensations are be related to objects, namely those that constitute the material elements of empirical intuitions.  In the Kritik der Urtheilskraft Kant distinguishes between the green sensory content of my intuition of a meadow from the pleasure I take in the meadow; the former is an objective sensation because it is ‘referred to the object’ (it presents the object as being green), while the latter does not have any representational content (Ak. 5:206).  The sensory content of an empirical intuition is the ‘matter’ while the spatial content is its ‘form.’  Kant thinks that outer appearances lack all secondary qualities like color, so he has to think that, insofar as empirical intuitions have sensory content, this sensory content always misrepresents its objects.  However, sensory content in empirical intuition is the indication or sign of reality, e.g. causal force, in the object of the intuition.​[61]​  So while the sensory content of empirical intuitions represents objects as having properties they lack, it indicates -- without representing – the presence of properties they do possess.​[62]​
This shows that sensations do have intentional content, but only insofar as they are constituents of empirical intuitions, perceptions.  This reinforces the suggestion from above that Strong Experience is justified by perceptions (empirical intuitions), or, perhaps (partly to satisfy Sellarsian scruples), by facts about the contents of perceptions had by subjects. But perceptions are also among the inner appearances that have their empirical properties in virtue of the content of Strong Experience. My initial presentation of the theory would then have to be modified as follows:

But this seems to reintroduce the Exclusion problem, since the perceptions that appear at the bottom (highlighted) are among the inner appearances in the upper left-hand (highlighted).  Thus, at least for perceptions, those two roles in the network of dependence relations collapse, producing:

But this appears to bring back the Exclusion problem, precisely the problem my interpretation tried to avoid.  We have one set of facts – facts about the sensory content of perceptions – grounding a second set of facts – facts about the empirical properties of outer objects – which cause the first set of facts to obtain.  Even worse, the facts about the sensory contents of perceptions obtain in virtue of the content of Strong Experience, which has its content in virtue of those very facts about the sensory contents of perceptions!  Not only do we have the Exclusion problem, we have one set of facts grounding itself.
	The Exclusion problem was formulated in terms of causal and grounding relations between facts.   Thus, these figures need to be interpreted as asserting relations of causal and metaphysical dependence between facts involving the objects listed.  For instance, arrow (4) at the top of Figure Three asserts a causal relation between facts about outer appearances and facts about inner appearances.  What the previous paragraph discussion shows is that the justifiers of Strong Experience will be facts about the contents of perceptions (bottom of Figure Three, the ‘A-facts’), and that facts about the contents of those perceptions (upper left-hand corner of Figure Three, the ‘B-facts’) will also be caused by facts about outer appearances.
However, the Exclusion problem only resurfaces if the set of A-facts and the set of B-facts overlap; otherwise, the causal dependence of the B-facts upon facts about outer objects will not entail the causal dependence of any A-facts upon facts about outer objects, as represented in Figure Three.  But, as I will now argue, the A- and B-facts are disjoint; no A-fact is a B-fact, and vice versa. Let me explain what I have in mind.  The facts in the bottom row are facts about which how my perceptions seem to me.  These facts are the justifiers for Strong Experience because they are the facts to which I have immediate conscious access.  For instance, in determining the true motions of bodies I start with the motions bodies seem to me to have.  The facts in the upper left-hand corner are facts about the empirical properties of my mental states.  Since perceptions are a proper subset of my mental states (which include sensations, feelings, etc.), it follows that the upper left-hand corner will include facts about the empirical properties of my perceptions.  Perceptions, as inner appearances, have their empirical properties in virtue of the content of Strong Experience.  We have epistemic access to Strong Experience only through a process we might think of as ‘constructing experience out of perceptions’: comparing and sifting through perceptions to find the most law-like representation confirmed by our perceptions.  Since the B-facts obtain in virtue of the content of Strong Experience, and our epistemic access to Strong Experience is through our perceptions, it follows that our epistemic access to our perceptions, the starting point for Strong Experience, is via our introspective awareness of the A-facts.  We cannot start by looking at the facts about our perceptions as those perceptions are represented by Strong Experience; we must first consult our perceptions in order to construct Strong Experience.  In introspecting the contents of our perceptions we are acquainted with the A-facts.   Now I need to argue that the A-facts and the B-facts are disjoint, that no fact is both an A-fact and a B-fact. 
To see that they are disjoint it suffices to reiterate a point made in the previous section: it is possible that the content of my perceptual state as I am aware of it in conscious introspection will differ from the content that perceptual states is represented as having in Strong Experience.  To use the example from the previous section, my introspective awareness of my perceptual state may represent it as having a longer or shorter temporal duration than it actually has.  I may learn through natural scientific reasoning that my perceptual experience has different properties than, through introspection, it seems to me to have.   Consider the following argument: 
(1)	Let P be a perception of a subject S, and F be an empirical property that perceptions can have.

(2)	It is possible for the fact [P is F] to obtain while the fact [P seems to be F] does not obtain.

(3)	Therefore, the fact [P seems to S to be F] is not identical to the fact [P is F].

(4)	A-facts are of the form [P seems to S to be F] and B-facts are of the form [P is F].

(5)	Therefore, no A-fact is a B-fact.

where ‘[p]’ stands for the fact that p.  This argument is simply an application of the principle that if x and y are the same fact, then necessarily, a obtains if and only if b obtains.  The conclusion follows even where both the fact [P seems S to be F] and [P is F] obtain; because it is possible for one fact to obtain without the other, they are not one and the same fact.
Nonetheless, the properties involved in the A-facts will typically be among the properties involved in the B-facts; my conscious awareness does not massively distort the empirical properties of my perceptions (as it sometimes does the empirical properties of outer objects).  However, the reason for this convergence is not that the same set of facts and properties are playing two different roles – and thus collapsing Figure Two into Figure Three, reproducing the Exclusion problem.  The reason for this is the nature of the justification relationship between facts about how subjects’ perceptions seem to them (A-facts) and facts about the content of Strong Experience.  In almost all cases, a theory which represents my inner states as being the way I am consciously aware of them is going to be overall better justified than a theory that represents my inner states differently.  This is not always going to be the case; as I’ve mentioned, in some cases, it won’t hold.  But this shows that, although the properties involved in the A-facts are going to largely overlap with the properties involved in the B-facts, the A and B- facts are not identical. 
Some readers might object that the argument (1)-(3) is only sound for some values of F because (2) is false for some values of F; some values of F have the following property: any perception seems F is F, and vice versa.  For instance, if some perception seems painful, then it is painful.  While this seems obviously correct about pain, I don’t think it undermines my argument, for two reasons.  First of all, we are primarily concerned with empirical properties of perceptions of outer appearances, because we are trying to leave room for empirical affection: those perceptions are caused to have those empirical properties by outer objects.  As my discussion so far has made clear, we are primarily concerned with the sensory content of perceptions insofar as that sensory content is representational, e.g. the redness of the perception insofar as the perception is a perception as of redness (the ‘objective’ sensation ‘referred’ to the object, in Kant’s terminology).  Given that Kant allows unconscious representational content​[63]​, it seems highly plausible that there can be representational content in a perception that it does not seem to have.  Secondly, even if there are values of F for which (2) is false, I would still insist that the fact [P is F] and [P seems F] are distinct facts.  Even if, necessarily, either both of these facts obtain or neither does, it seems clear they are distinct facts: one is a fact about how P seems, the other is not.  I think this is sufficient to defend the argument (1)-(3) against the objection.​[64]​
A full presentation of the network of causal and grounding relations that makes explicit the fact-fact nature of the relations and the distinctness of the A- and B-facts would look like this:




















^1	  In some passages, Kant claims that all empirical causal laws are a posteriori (e.g. B164, Ak. 5:183); in the Preface to the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft he claims that certain laws (e.g. the law of inertia) are a priori.  For a fuller discussion of Kant’s views on the epistemic status of particular causal laws, see Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992), ch. 3-4. Citations to the works of Kant give the volume and page number in the Academy edition (Ak.), Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900—).  All citations to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft use the customary format of giving the page in the 1st-edition of 1781 (A), followed by the page in the 2nd-edition of 1787 (B) (e.g. A327/B384).  When followed by a four-digit number, ‘R’ refers to Kant’s unpublished Reflections in vol. 17 & 18 of the Academy edition. Unless otherwise noted, translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Complete Works of Immanuel Kant, eds. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998—).
^2	  Cf. Hans Vaihinger’s masterful exposition of this problem and its history in Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1892), vol. 2, 35-55. 
^3	  See A28-9 and A92/B125.  For a more nuanced view of Kant’s views on color, see the footnote to B70 and Lucy Allais, “Kant’s Idealism and the Secondary Quality Analogy” Journal of the History of Philosophy 45(3), 459-84.
^4	  Kant clearly endorses empirical affection at A28, A92/B125, B208, A168/B210, A213/B260, Prolegomena §13 Remark II (Ak. 4:289), Groundwork III (Ak. 4:457), and the Preface to Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Ak. 4:476).  Furthermore, I take it to be implicit in Kant’s examples in the second Analogy of perceiving parts of a house (A191/B236) and of perceiving a ship sailing downstream (A192/B237), as well as the argument of the Refutation of Idealism (B274-279).  Erich Adickes discusses these texts and others in Kants Lehre von der doppleten Affektion unseres Ichs als Schlüssel zu seiner Erkenntnistheorie (Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr: Tübingen, 1929), 5-15.
^5	  In the third chapter of Kant und das Ding an Sich (Berlin: Pan Verlag Rolf Heisse, 1924), Erich Adickes assembles an impressive array of textual evidence for this claim.  See especially A190/B235, A387, A494/B522,  Ak. 4:289, 4:314, 4:318, 4:451 and 8:215.
^6	  Thus, the fundamental motivation for a ‘double affection’ interpretation is textual, not philosophical, a point not sufficiently appreciated in Moltke Gram, “The Myth of Double Affection” in Werkmeister (ed.), Reflections on Kant’s Philosophy. University of Florida Press: Gainesville, 1975. However, I also think there are powerful philosophical reasons for Kant to accept both noumenal and empirical affection.
^7	  Kants Lehre von der doppleten Affektion unseres Ichs als Schlüssel zu seiner Erkenntnistheorie (Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr: Tübingen, 1929) and Kant und das Ding an Sich  (Berlin: Pan Verlag Rolf Heisse, 1924).   [Omitted self-reference.]  For more on the history of the double affection controversy see also Hans Drexler, Die doppelte Affektion des erkennenden Subjekts (Beuthen o.S.: Th. Kirch, 1904); Adickes, Kants Opus Postumum, dargestellet und beurteilt (Berlin, 1920); Appendix C to Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), especially his discussion of the Opus Postumum in Appendix C; T.D. Weldon, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Oxford: The Clarnedon Press, 1958), 252-56; and Hans Vaihinger, Commentar, vol. 2, 35-55, esp. 53-55. 
^8	  Holzhey and Murdoch (eds.), Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism (Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 108.  The claim that Adickes’s argument is based largely on the Opus Postumum is unfair; Adickes assembles extensive textual evidence from the first Critique itself for double affection.  In order to demonstrate the falsity of this charge, in this paper I will not include any textual evidence from the Opus Postumum.
^9	  The canonical expression of this problem is given by Jacobi in his 1788 work David Hume über den Glauben, odere Realismus und Idealismus: ein Gespräch; see F.H. Jacobi, Werke (Meiner/Frommann-Holzboog, 2004), II, 109. 
^10	  As James Van Cleve has pointed out, it is not inconsistent for Kant to claim p and I cannot know whether p. But Kant does not merely claim that things in themselves affect us, he claims this follows from the mere concept of an appearance: “in fact, if we view the objects of the senses as mere appearances, as it fitting, then we thereby admit at the very same time that a thing in itself underlies them, although we are not acquainted with this thing as it may be constituted in itself, but only with its appearance, i.e. with the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something” (Ak. 4:314f).  Kant here claims for noumenal affection an epistemic status at least prima facie incompatible with the doctrine of our irremediable ignorance of things in themselves.
^11	  In his discussion of the problem of affection, Vaihinger lists Fichte, Beck, Maimon, and Heramnn Cohen, among others, as “Kantianer” who denied noumenal affection.
^12	  Although Henry Allison and Gerold Prauss criticize the traditional doctrine of double affection, as formulated by Adickes, their views in fact include a modified form of double affection.  Empirical affection and noumenal affection are two different ways of describing one and the same relation of causal affection.  Empirical affection is the causal relation between the object and the subject’s mind described from within the empirical standpoint, which takes the spatiotemporal object and its categorial determinations as a given.  Noumenal affection is the same causal relation described within the transcendental standpoint, which abstracts from the spatiotemporal character of the outer object.  As I understand their views, noumenal affection is simply a highly abstract characterization of the relation between object and subject: for finite subjects like us, empirical knowledge requires causal input from some outer object.  Consequently, they can accept both empirical and noumenal affection, although in a very different sense than Adickes does.  See Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 247-54, and Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an Sich (Bonn: Herbert Grundmann, 1974), 192-227.  Cf. Allison’s discussion of the problem of affection in the revised second edition of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 64-73. However, for precisely this reason, Allison and Prauss’s ability to admit double affection stands or falls with the idea that claims about things in themselves are merely claims from the ‘transcendental standpoint’ which abstracts from spatiotemporal character of outer objects.  But if this is correct, then Kant could never be justified in claiming that things in themselves are not spatiotemporal; when we abstractly from a certain set of properties of objects (e.g. their spatial properties) we do not thereby assert that these objects lack those properties.  This objection was raised originally by Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 337-338; cf. Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 7, 146-150; and Lorne Falkenstein, “Kant’s Argument for the Nonspatiotemporality of Things in Themselves” Kant-Studien 80 (1-4):265-283.  In this paper I do not have space to further discuss this, and other, objections to the Allison-Prauss view.  I mention this merely to point out that, although their view can elegantly account for double affection, there are reasons to look for an account of double affection that does not depend upon their ‘epistemic’ interpretation of transcendental idealism.
^13	  See  Bxxvi, A88/B120, B167n, A254/B309, Ak. 5:43, and 5:55.   Cf. Desmond Hogan, “Noumenal Affection” Philosophical Review 118(4): 501-532.  Hogan also refers to several recent works that defend the application of categories to things in themselves; see “Noumenal Affection,” 504 and note 11 on that page.
^14	  See A532/B560-A558/B586, and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Ak. 5:97-98).
^15	  Readers concerned with attributing the doctrine of noumenal affection for either of these reasons should see the first section of Hogan’s “Noumenal Affection” for a convincing case that Kant in fact held that view.  However, I find the rest of Hogan’s paper, in which he tries to show how noumenal affection and noumenal ignorance are compatible, highly problematic. 
^16	  The restriction of F to empirical properties is necessary because empirical objects are appearances of thing in themselves, but are not represented in experience as being appearances of things in themselves.
^17	  The qualification ‘in standard cases’ is meant to rule out two cases: (1) cases where although the object has F, its having F does not cause the subject to experience it as F (either because of pre-emption, or because of veridical hallucination, etc.), and (2) cases where the object is not F although the subject experiences it as F.  The most important class of cases of the second kind will be ‘secondary qualities,’ since Kant holds the Lockean view that empirical objects possess only primary qualities, in virtue of which they cause subjects to experience them as having secondary qualities.  For a discussion of Kant’s views of primary qualities and how they relate to the problem of double affection, see James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 167-171. 
^18	  I am not claiming that this is all that Kant’s transcendental idealism amounts to; I am merely using ‘Transcendental Idealism’ to label one of the many commitments of that complex doctrine, namely, that appearances depend for their empirical properties upon experience.
^19	  The ‘in virtue of’ relation has been the focus of some exciting recent work in metaphysics. See especially Gideon Rosen, “Metaphysical Dependence” in Hale and Hoffmann, ed., Modality: Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 109-135 and Paul Audi, "A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding” (forthcoming).
^20	  Werke II, 108. Eckart Förster also reads this as an anticipation of the Exclusion problem (although he does not call it that): “The course of Jacobi’s thought is clear: because the objects of experience, according to Kant, are themselves constructions out of representations of sensibility, they cannot themselves be causes of these representations” (Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 2011). Also, Fichte’s Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre takes up this point exactly; cf. Fichte, Werke I, 488.
^21	  Vaihinger, Commentar, II, 43. Vaihinger formulates the problem in terms of the existence of empirical objects. Because I want to remain neutral in this paper on whether the existence of appearances is grounded in the contents of experience, I have formulated the Exclusion problem in terms of the properties of empirical objects. Vaihinger further identifies this as a problem specifically for empirical affection.  However, as I argue later in the body of the paper, this is equally a problem for double affection because it shows that noumenal affection excludes empirical affection.  One reason Vaihinger does not identify this as a problem for double affection is that he closely identifies double affection with Erich Adickes’s version of that doctrine, and the problem he raises for double affection is specifically a problem for Adickes.  [Omitted self-reference.]  The doctrine of double affection I defend in the present paper does not face the problem Vaihinger raises for Adickes.
^22	  Going back even further in the history of Kant reception, one can see the Exclusion problem as an updated form of a problem already raised by F.H. Jacobi in 1788.  Jacobi rejects the doctrine of affection, and hence Kant’s definition of sensibility as the capacity to receive representations insofar as we are affected by them, because the affecting objects in question cannot be things in themselves (which are unknowable, and to which the category of cause-effect does not apply), nor can they be empirical objects because empirical objects are mere “Vorstellungen” which are “nicht ausser uns vorhanden” (Werke II, 108).  Jacobi’s reason for rejecting empirical affection is that he shares the assumption of some of Kant’s early readers that appearances are identical to representations, understood as mental states of subjects; on reading of Kant, appearances cannot affect our mental states because they just are collections of our mental states.  The Exclusion problem shows that a version of Jacobi’s objection remains even if we reject the crude Berkeleyan understanding of Kantian appearances: even if appearances are not just bundles of representations, they have their empirical properties in virtue of the contents of our representations of them, so they cannot be causes of that very content.
^23	  Problems from Kant, 8-12.
^24	  Problems from Kant, 165-6.
^25	  Problems from Kant, 171.
^26	  See A30/B45 where Kant writes that the “true correlate” of empirical objects, the thing in itself, “is never asked after in experience [nach welchem aber auch in der Erfahrung niemals gefragt wird].”
^27	  I suspect that the following is the correct account: a property is an empirical property just in case it is a determinate of some determinable categorial property.  A categorial property is the property of falling under a given category, e.g. the property of being a substance, or being a positive reality.  Thus, being a particular kind of substance, or having a determinate degree of some positive reality are empirical properties. However, to fully develop this account lies outside the scope of this paper.
^28	  The referent of ‘both’ [beide] is unclear in this passage.  Does it refer to ‘both space and time’?  Or to ‘both empirical truth and dream’? From the larger context of the passage,  and from grammatical considerations (‘Raum’ and ‘Zeit’ are in the dative while ‘beide’ is nominative) I think it’s clear that both refers to ‘both inner and outer appearances.’  So the sentence should read: “in space and time, however, the empirical truth of appearances is satisfactorily secured, and sufficiently distinguished from its kinship with dreams, if both [inner and outer appearances] are correctly and thoroughly connected up according to empirical laws in one experience.”  I also take this to be compatible with my reading: what distinguishes dreams from experience is that in experience there is law-like coherence among my inner appearances and the outer objects they represent, as well as among the outer objects themselves.   The point is that experience is internally lawfully coherent in a way that dreams are not.
^29	  In fact, I think there is a third sense of ‘experience’ in Kant’s writings, in which it is supposed to be a neutral term between Kant and his interlocutors.  This emerges most clearly in contexts where Kant is agreeing with the empiricist view that concepts of necessary connections (more generally, a priori concepts) cannot come from sensation.  For instance, in describing Hume’s problem, Kant claims that “experience teaches me what there is, and how it is, but never that it necessarily must be so and not otherwise” (Prol. § 14; Ak. 4:294).  ‘Experience’ here refers to something that is acceptable in an empiricist epistemology, something like Lockean ideas of sense and reflection. But it cannot mean the same thing as experience in the sense of the ‘one’ experience (A110) (Strong Experience) because Strong Experience represents laws, thus does represent necessity.  Nor can ‘experience’ here mean perception.  This is more controversial, but I think that Kantian perceptions are ‘categorially’ loaded: they represent their objects as substances, as having causal powers, etc.  So in contexts in which Kant is agreeing with one basic empiricist view -- we do not receive impressions of necessity -- ‘experience’ means something different; in Kantian terms, it refers roughly to the sensory matter our faculty of sensibility receives.  Pulling apart all of the different senses in which Kant uses the term ‘experience,’ however, lies far outside the scope of this essay.
^30	  Compare Kant’s claim in the A Deduction that “there is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or non-being take place.  If one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience” (A110; Kant’s emphasis) and his discussion of the “one, all-encompassing experience” (A582/B610) in the Transcendental Ideal.  I take it that the ‘one experience’ of the A Deduction is the ‘all-encompassing experience’ of the Transcendental Ideal, which is the ‘one experience’ of the Antinomies.  Kant is contrasting individual experiences with Strong Experience.
^31	  Cf. Kant’s discussion in On a discovery (Ak. 8:205) of bodies and parts of bodies that are too small to be seen.  Kant points out, contra Eberhard, that these bodies are still sensible objects, and thus appearances, even though our sense organs are too coarse-grained to perceive them. 
^32	  My interpretation of Strong Experience is further confirmed by Kant’s definitions of actuality in experience.  His discussion of the postulate of actuality itself is somewhat misleading, because it focuses on the conditions under which we can verify whether something is actual rather than what actuality consists in for empirical objects, but various other statements about actuality are more helpful.  For instance: “if [the object] is in connection with perceptions (sensation, as the matter of the senses, and through this determined by means of the understanding, then the object is actual” (A234/B286).  This should be compared to his remark in the Refutation of Idealism that "whether this or that putative experience is not mere imagination must be ascertained according to its particular determinations and through its coherence with the criteria of all actual experience” (B279).  Since the criteria of all actual experience is “connection” (which I take to mean connection according to empirical laws) with actual sensation, I take this to be direct confirmation of my interpretation.
^33	  Cf. Jäsche Logik §40, Ak. 9:113.
^34	  Ak. 4: 554-555. Friedman draws the same parallel in Kant and the Exact Sciences, p. 184-5.
^35	  “Empirical judgments, insofar as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; those, however, that are only subjectively valid I call mere judgments of perception” (Ak. 4:298.1-2; cf. ).  Note that by drawing a parallel between ‘Strong Experience’ and ‘judgments of experience’ I am committed to the claim that objects have whatever properties judgments of experience represent them as having; there can be no false judgments of experience.  Some readers may balk at this; see, however, Kant’s claim that judgment of experience have “necessary universal validity” (298.10) -- which is a reciprocal concept with “objective validity” (298.17)-- and that they “express a property of an object” (298.14).  I don’t think, though, that judgments of perception and judgments of experience exhaust all possible empirical judgments; one can make a false judgment about empirical objects that involves the categories. This interpretation of the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience is not universally granted.  For a dissenting view, see Béatrice Longunesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 170-179.
^36	  Kant’s description of apparent motions as ‘appearances’ [Erscheinungen] is an instance of his tendency sometimes to use ‘appearance’ to mean ‘mere appearance’ as opposed to a fully conceptual determined object of experience, a phaenomenon.  The locus classicus for this is his definition of appearance as the ‘undetermined object’ of an intuition at A20/B34.  However, in some texts he equates ‘Erscheinung’ with ‘phaenomenon,’ suggesting that ‘appearance’ does not always mean mere appearance;  see A248/B305 (where appearances are phenomena insofar as they are determined by the categories), Prolegomena §13 (Ak. 4:314), and the ‘Real Progress’ essay (Ak. 20:269).
^37	  Ak. 4:301n.
^38	  Arguably, this is so in the Kritik’s case of the magnetic matter, and Kant’s discussion of Newtonian lamellae in Über eine Entdeckung (Ak. 8:205).
^39	  This also allows us to answer the question: who (if anyone) is the subject of Strong Experience?  Some readers will have noticed that explicit reference to the subject of Strong Experience has dropped out. Some contents of subjects’ sensory states will be incorporated into the content of Strong Experience, while some will not be.  For instance, my current perception involves a lot of content that is not retained within Strong Experience – for instance, the sensory content that represents outer objects as colored, textured, etc. – because Kant holds the common early modern view that there is no need to posit secondary qualities in outer objects because we can explain the presence of sensory content by the causal stimulus of our sense organs by bodies that have only primary qualities and causal forces. However, if I am perceptually normal and I am perceiving objects under appropriate conditions, some of the content of my sensory states will be preserved by Strong Experience, for instance, my present perception of the approximate sizes, shapes and locations of bodies in my environment.   When I am hallucinating, by contrast, none of the content of my sensory states is content that will be incorporated into the content of Strong Experience.  I take it that all human subjects, insofar as their sensory states participate in justifying Strong Experience and the content of those states is at least partly retained within the content of Strong Experience, are the subjects of Strong Experience.  Remember: “if one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience” (A110).  Insofar as I have perceptions that partly justify and whose contents are partly incorporated into Strong Experience, to that extent I am experiencing rather than merely perceiving, i.e. am a subject of Strong Experience.
^40	  See A374-5: “One must note well this paradoxical but correct proposition, that nothing is in space except what is represented in it.  For space itself is nothing other than representation; consequently, what is in it must be contained in representation, and nothing at all is in space except insofar as it is really represented in it.  A proposition which must of course sound peculiar is that a thing can exist only in the representation of it; but it loses its offensive character here, because the things with which we have to do are not things in themselves but only appearances, i.e. representations.” Cf. A506/B534, Ak. 4:342, 4:506. 
^41	  My use of ‘intentional object’ here is potentially confusing, since that term is usually applied to objects whose ‘whole being’ (existence, and all their properties) depends upon the content of some representations.  However, in this paper I want to remain neutral on whether appearances depend for their existence on experience.  Consequently, I use the term ‘intentional object’ in a slightly modified fashion.  When I say that empirical objects are the intentional objects of Strong Experience I mean: their empirical properties depend upon the content of Strong Experience.  The reason I do not want to claim that the existence of an appearance depends upon the content of Strong Experience is that some ‘one object’ readers will find this claim incompatible with their understanding of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.  After all, if every appearance is numerically identical to a thing in itself, and the existence of a thing in itself does not depend upon Strong Experience, it would seem to follow that the existence of an appearance cannot so depend. 
^42	  There is a trivial and a non-trivial way of understanding this issue. The trivial way is: if there were no experience, would there be any objects of experience?  The answer to that question, obviously, is ‘no.’  The non-trivial question is: take some object we actually experience – would it exist if there were no experience?  I think the answer is ‘no’ but I recognize that some ‘one object’ readers would disagree.   However, I think that the ‘one object’ reading, properly developed, is compatible with answering ‘no,’ i.e. with admitting that objects of experience are de re existentially dependent upon experience.  However, that lies far outside the scope of this paper. [Omitted self-reference.]
^43	  In my original formulation of the problem, I took the ‘in virtue of’ relation and the causal relation to be relations between facts.  However, at this point in the exegesis, I don’t think it’s crucial to distinguish between, for instance, empirical objects and facts about them. I take it that the reader will see how to appropriately translate everything into fact talk.
^44	  It would be more precise to say: facts about the contents of Strong Experience obtain in virtue of justificatory relationships between that content, and sensory contents, on the one hand, and a priori materials, on the other.  Consequently, facts about the contents of Strong Experience obtain partly in virtue of justificatory relations between that content and the sensory content.  But I think we can abstract from this complication.
^45	  I am taking it that ‘x is a logical construction of the ys’ entails ‘x exists in virtue of facts about the ys.’
^46	  Of course this is not, strictly speaking, Locke’s own view, or at least does not correspond to his terminology.  On Locke’s view, bodies possess both primary and secondary qualities, because these are merely powers to produce certain ideas in us.  The distinction is that the ideas of primary qualities resemble qualities in bodies, while the ideas of secondary qualities do not.  For ease of exposition, in the body of the paper I follow the standard contemporary use of the terms, using ‘primary quality’ to refer to properties like being extended, having a certain size, etc. and ‘secondary quality’ to refer to properties like having a color, smell, etc. See Locke, Essay on Human Understanding II.8.9-26.
^47	  See A28, A29/B45, and A45-6/B63.  See Problems from Kant, 167-171. 
^48	  Problems from Kant, 171
^49	  As is clear from the way I set up the Exclusion problem initially, my view owes a lot to Van Cleve.  It might be worthwhile, therefore, for me to explain where my interpretation differs from Van Cleve’s.  On Van Cleve’s view, appearances are ‘virtual objects.’  I take this to mean that appearances exist, and have their empirical properties, in virtue of facts about mental states of subjects.  Van Cleve distinguishes three different ‘in virtue of’ relations that might hold among appearances and mental states.  It might be that statements about appearances are meaning-equivalent to statements about mental states of subjects; since Kant’s idealism is not a thesis about meaning, it is not plausible that this is Kant’s view.  On the view Van Cleve favors, facts about appearances are identical to facts about mental states of subjects.  According to Van Cleve, the only objects there are in Kant’s ontology are things in themselves, including subjects and their mental states. This seems to fly in the face of much of what Kant has to say about appearances as empirical objects in the Critique.  On the third view, empirical objects are what Van Cleve calls (misleadingly, I think) ‘supervenient entities’: they are genuine objects (legitimate values for variables bound by quantifiers) that exist and have their empirical properties in virtue of the contents of subjects’ mental states.  My interpretation is a version of the ‘supervenient’ entities interpretation.  First of all, I take the relevant ‘in virtue of’ relation to be the ‘grounding’ relation, a relation of non-causal metaphysical dependence that, I think, is ubiquitous in Kant and the Rationalist tradition, but which has only recently become an explicit topic of research in contemporary metaphysics.  See note 16 for some recent discussions of it.  It is misleading for Van Cleve to call this the ‘supervenient entities’ view because the claim is stronger than the claim that empirical objects supervene on the mental states of subjects; supervenience is a relatively weak relation that is compatible with dependence in the opposite direction, or no dependence at all. Thirdly, in this paper I am defending only the claim that appearances have their empirical properties in virtue of the content of Strong Experience.  I also think that, on Kant’s view, appearances exist in virtue of the content of Strong Experience, but I do not have the space to argue for that here.  That more controversial claim has significant textual evidence to overcome, such as Kant’s claim that “representation in itself does not produce its objects in so far as existence is concerned” (A92/B125).  Since I do not identify appearances with mental states of subjects, my interpretation is not subject to the criticisms of Van Cleve made by Ameriks (2006).  Influential criticisms of ‘phenomenalist’ readings of Kant are rasied by Lucay Allais in her “Kant’s One World: Interpreting Transcendental Idealism” British Journal of the History of Philosophy 12(4) 2004: 655-684.  Allais criticizes the view that appearances are ‘constructions’ out of subjects’ mental states, and it might be thought that on my view that is what appearances are.  Appearances are constructions of subjects’ mental states in the sense that they have their empirical properties in virtue of the content of those states; but they are not constructions if ‘constructions’ means sums, collections, etc.  Allais raises eight separate objections to the ‘phenomenalist’ reading of Kant.  It should be clear from the body of the text, though, that objections (3)-(7) do not apply to my view.  I also think that objections (1), (2) and (8) miss their mark, but answering them lies outside the scope of this paper.  I will just briefly say that objection (2) – “Kant’s claim that his notion of appearances implies things which appear” – applies to a phenomenalist reading of Kant only if, on that reading, all there is to being an appearance is being the intentional object of a sufficiently rich set of experiences.  But my interpretation is not committed to that; my principle about the grounding of empirical properties in Strong Experience takes a conditional form: if x is an appearance, etc.  I have not said anything about what it is for an object to be an appearance.  In fact, my view about this incorporates precisely the Kantian doctrine – the idea of appearances requires that there be things in themselves that appear – Allais claims cannot be accommodated by a phenomenalist reading.  On my view, which I do not defend here, to be an appearance is to be represented by a Strong Experience whose perceptual inputs are caused by things in themselves and whose content is structurally isomorphic to the relations among those things in themselves.  Thus, on my view, the idea of appearances does require that there be things in themselves appearing to us as those appearances.  For reasons of space, though, I cannot further articulate or defend this position here.
^50	  See note 7 for an alternate account of ‘double affection’ within the ‘one object’ reading of Henry Allison and Gerold Prauss.  I’m not sure my version of double affection is compatible with their ‘epistemological’ reading of Kant’s idealism.
^51	  There is an extensive literature on the Refutation of Idealism.  See especially Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 279-329; George Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (New York: Oxford, 2004), 194-211; for an incisive critique of Guyer and Dicker, see Andrew Chignell, “Causal Refutations of Idealism” The Philosophical Quarterly (2009), 1-21.  I take it that all of my claims in this paper are independent of debates about the argument of the Refutation.
^52	  Some readers might object that Kant’s argument in the Refutation is that knowledge of empirical objects is a necessary condition for knowledge of the order of my subjective states, not of their duration.  I am not claiming otherwise here.  I am merely pointing out that if the experience whose content determines the properties of inner appearances were mere ‘empirical apperception,’ this would have the obviously false consequence that I could infallibly know the duration of my subjective states by consulting how long they seemed to me to last.
^53	  See note 32.
^54	  With the important qualification that only their empirical properties depend upon Strong Experience. See note 28 for an important qualification on my use of the term ‘intentional object.’
^55	  For instance, Kant claims that our empirical character is an appearance of our intelligible character (A538/B566-A558/B586); in the Groundwork he claims that “the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and of its laws” (Ak. 4:453); and in the Prolegomena he writes that “reason is the cause of these natural laws and is therefore free” (Ak. 4:346).
^56	  This is, in part, because I am remaining neutral, in this paper, on what it is in virtue of which appearances exist. See note 32.
^57	  This is my gloss on the definition of sensation at A320/B376.
^58	  I draw here on Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), ch. 3-4.
^59	  In the first Kritik see A320/B376 and A165/B208.
^60	  This comes out especially clearly in the third Kritik (Ak. 5:189, 203, 206, 291) and in the Anthropology in its distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ senses (Ak. 7:154).
^61	  See the ‘Anticipations of Perception’ (A165/B207-A176/B218), especially A165/B207-A169/B211.
^62	  Obviously, the indication/representation distinction is not philosophically unproblematic, but I take it that it is intuitively clear.  Smoke indicates the presence of a fire, but it does not represent the fire.
^63	  Cf. Anthropologie 7:135.
^64	  A reader might object: what about the case of the A-fact [P seems F] and the B-fact [P is G] where G is the property ‘seems F’?  That would appear to be a case in which one and the same fact is both an A-fact and a B-fact.  However, we need to bear in mind that the properties in question here are empirical properties of perceptions, properties Strong Experience represents inner appearances like perceptions as having.  B-facts, after all, are facts about the empirical properties of inner appearances.  I think it is very plausible that the property ‘seems F’ is not going to be among the empirical properties Strong Experience attributes to inner appearances; it is highly plausible that Strong Experience will limit itself to attributing temporal and representational properties to perceptions, since it is the idealized psycho-physical theory justified by the A-facts about our perceptions.
